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T he traditional advice given to the prince in the Ottoman Empire (late fifteenth century) was:
“Look with favor on the merchants in the 
land; always care for them; let no one harass 
them; let no one order them about; for through 
their trading, the land becomes prosperous 
and by their wares, cheapness (or inexpensive-
ness) abounds in the world.”1
Turkish economy has been subject to a vari-
ety of analyses, based on different perspectives. 
Depending on the analytical tools employed, 
however, the scope of and the inferences from 
the analyses change dramatically. Based on 
an assessment of Turkey’s new foreign policy 
orientation through its foreign trade perfor-
mance, this paper is focused on the specific 
arguments around trade policies and takes on 
a political economy perspective. The period of 
2002-2008 under the AK Party’s administra-
tion is regarded as a significant landmark in 
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Our analysis will discuss Turkey’s 
changing direction, if any, in terms 
of its trade orientation. This paper 
argues that Turkey’s trade sector 
has maintained its long-standing 
direction towards the major 
European Union (EU) member 
countries with only minor setbacks, 
while new dimensions in bilateral 
trade have emerged not only 
due to Turkey’s changing foreign 
policy considerations but also 
global economic transformations. 
Moreover, this paper argues that 
Turkey’s trade partners are subject 
to these changes, as the epicentre 
of the global economy shifts, i.e. 
to the East. In the first section, a 
brief introduction with regards to 
Turkey’s foreign trade under the AK 
Party’s administration -since 2002 
will be provided. The second section 
will discuss the scope of regional 
and worldwide changes in trade 
patterns and analyze the recent 
shift in Turkey’s trade orientation in 
the context of Asia’s economic and 
political rise in early 21st century. 
The Third section will focus on the 
role of political dynamics in Turkey’s 
trade sector and structural issues.
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terms of Turkey’s foreign policy as well 
as its trade orientation. A new multi-di-
mensional approach grounded in a theo-
retical background re-defining the coun-
try’s position as a central power -rather 
than peripheral- power thrust Turkey into a new era. The country has engaged 
in new bilateral relationships, strongly motivated by economic and commercial 
demands in the last decade, particularly during the AK Party’s term.
Along with many other aspects, Turkey’s increasing economic performance 
manifested itself in the continuous surge in the volume of its export which 
reached 36 billion US Dollars in 2002, 47.3 billion US Dollars in 2003, 63.2 bil-
lion US Dollars in 2004, 73.5 billion US Dollars, and 85.5 billion US Dollars by 
2006. During the period of 2004-2006, the AK Party government undertook the 
Exports Strategic Plan, which was a roadmap for Turkey’s new export orientation 
as well as rising targets. The Plan targeted a total export volume of 75 billion US 
Dollars by the end of 2006, which it exceeded by more than 10 billion. Turkey 
ranked 22nd in terms of exports during the period of 2004-2006, compared to 
its previous position of 25th in 2002, according to the World Trade Organization 
statistics.2
Exports witnessed robust growth rates, with 25.3 percent in 2007 and 23.1 per-
cent in 2008. Therefore, the total volume of Turkey’s exports reached 107.2 billion 
US Dollars and 132 billion US Dollars in 2007 and 2008, consecutively. The share 
of industrial sector exports was 115.2 billion US Dollars as of 2008. The main 
export destination for Turkey in 2008 remained by far the EU-27, as the exports 
to the EU members reached 63.4 billion US Dollars, with an increase of 4.9 per-
cent and a share of 48 percent out of the total. Due to the global financial crisis 
that erupted in 2008, however, Turkey’s main export markets as well as the world 
economy as a whole were negatively affected, so the total export volume decreased 
by a significant 22.6 percent. The total export volume dropped down to 102.1 
billion US Dollars in 2009, as shown in Figure 1 below. Nevertheless, it was still 
above the previously targeted 98.5 billion, envisioned by the Mid-term Economic 
Program (2010-2012). Exports to the EU-27 countries faced a sharp decline of 
25.8 percent in 2009, dropping to 47 billion US Dollars. However, two significant 
developments emerged within the second half of the decade. Turkey’s exports to 
the Middle East –especially to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) - and Afri-
can countries witnessed dramatic increases. The share of African economies as a 
Turkey’s changing foreign 
trade structure also fits the new 
global economic trends that 
began in the 1990s
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destination for Turkey’s exports, for instance, witnessed a strong increase of 12.3 
percent, reaching 10.2 billion US Dollars in 2009, where trade volume in almost 
all main export destinations fell drastically.3
Source: Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade, 2009
This analysis argues that the basic motivation behind Turkey’s emergence as 
a ‘rising star’ is foremost its economic, rather than political, cultural or religious 
orientation. “A major shift in the Turkish economy occurred in the 1980s with 
the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies. Despite several crises, the Turkish 
economy has developed to a considerable degree, making it the 16th largest in the 
world (in terms of total GDP by 2010). Turkey’s vibrant economy and the raising 
democratic standards (i.e. recent constitutional amendments) in the EU negotia-
tion process have increased its soft power in the region and made it particularly 
attractive for reformers.”4 
The argument of Turkey’s so-called “axis shift” appears to fit Turkey’s chang-
ing foreign trade scheme because the number of new export destinations and the 
significant rise in Turkey’s bilateral trade volume with Latin American, African 
and Mid-eastern countries as well as China illustrate this new orientation. How-
ever, Turkey’s changing foreign trade structure also fits the new global economic 
trends that began in the 1990s. A simple while careful analysis of the world mer-
chandise trade and Turkey’s export-import dynamics in the last decade show a 
considerable overlap. This is particularly true when it comes to the emergence of 
the East in the early 21st century as a new economic player and trade partner on 
the world scene. The exponential growth in Turkey’s economic figures needs to 
be placed in this context and qualified. The globally favorable investments, capital 
flows, and trade climate for emerging economies alongside Turkey’s politically 
Figure 1. Turkey’s Trade Volume by Years, 1980-2009
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stable domestic environment are arguably major contributing factors to Turkey’s 
robust economic performance. The increasing structural efficiencies and the low-
cost margins coupled with product and market differentiation strategies are also 
some of the components behind the rapid expansion witnessed through bilateral 
and multilateral trade. Record-high amounts of foreign direct investment (FDIs) 
are considered as other sources of economic growth, which attained 84 billion US 
Dollars during the period of 2002-2009, including mergers & acquisitions as well 
as privatization revenues.5
With its strong economic development over the decade, Turkey has become 
the focus of global interests, including major events such as the IMF-World Bank 
Annual Meetings in October 2009, globally important energy projects like the 
Nabucco gas pipeline, and strategically significant issues such as the Iranian nu-
clear standoff. In addition, Turkey’s regional significance is also on the rise as it 
is heavily involved in mediating Mideast peace efforts, resolving Balkan disputes, 
and attenuating rivalries in the Caucasus region. Trade, or in more general terms, 
business has been one of the driving forces of increased Turkish attractiveness in 
its region, particularly the Middle East. Turkey’s prolonged desire for becoming a 
full EU member and its harmonization efforts with the EU acquis led to extensive 
political, judicial, and economic reforms in the last decade.
From the far east to the west, the baiting ‘axis shift’ debate hovers around Tur-
key’s political re-orientation as “the questions being asked are whether Ankara is 
turning its back on the West and drawing closer to the East. This is described as 
a “shift of axis” and there is even talk of Turkey joining a Eurasian Union along 
with Russia, China and other regional countries, or finding its moorings as leader 
of an Islamic bloc in the Middle East and Central Asia.”6 The ‘axis shift’ argument 
taken up by the traditional elite’s new rhetoric claims that the AK Party govern-
ment has moved the country away from its prolonged axis –which is by definition 
‘the West.’ A very recent snapshot on the discussions around Turkey’s new ori-
entation or axis, however, rightly describes the ‘axis shift’ arguments as a simple 
form of political blackmail that is aimed at putting down Turkey’s new foreign 
policy makers.7 This study also shares the view that this axis shift debate is highly 
manipulative, as it lacks i) a proper definition of the ‘axis shift’; ii) the necessary 
conditions for the fulfillment of a real axis shift; and iii) a definition of Turkey’s 
present axis and the counter axes along with the necessities of sustaining an axis.8 
Based on these three basic deficiencies of the ongoing debate around Turkey’s 
shifting axis, the paper attempts to find evidence either “For” or “Against” the axis 
shift argument on the grounds of Turkey’s evolving nature of foreign trade. 
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‘Axis Shift’ Debate and the Unbearable Lightness of its Reasoning
This study asserts that the ongoing ‘axis shift’ debate is at the very least ground-
less, provided Turkey’s multi-dimensional and multi-layer foreign policy setup, im-
plemented effectively during the AK Party’s ruling term. The axis shift debate is not 
neutral and possesses a hidden negative connotation, as it carries with it an accusa-
tion that Turkey intends an expansion into new regions, as “those who accuse Tur-
key of changing axis confuse the transformation of global politics with that of val-
ues and (ideological) trends. And this is where the question of axis shift is perceived 
as a threat and there is a ringing of alarm bells. But Turkey is simply continuing the 
broad trends and values begun in 1839 during the period of the Tanzimat (Reor-
ganization) reforms,”9 according to moderate observers. Whether Turkey’s current 
policies are a continuation of the Tanzimat reforms or not, Turkey’s new orienta-
tion both at home and overseas deserves a more profound analysis. The frontiers of 
limitations of an axis shift, however, are not well defined and the arguments around 
it are based on perceptions rather than realities. Therefore, a robust definition for 
the term should be introduced for each epistemological and actual domain that 
would legitimize the ongoing debate. Since our analysis takes Turkey’s foreign trade 
as the central perspective, however, the subsequent arguments regarding the debate 
will be put forward accordingly. It is certain that the ‘axis shift’ debate is multi-di-
mensional, as it has political, historical, military and security, strategic, economic, 
and cultural aspects. The paper’s reading of the debate is, however, built upon the 
question of whether there is an axis shift on economic and specifically foreign trade 
grounds. Therefore, the descriptive economic data provided throughout the paper 
in the subsequent sections aims at providing an insight to the changing nature of 
the global economy as well as Turkey’s foreign trade orientation and (in the last 
section) its lack of proper strategies in the long-term. Other aspects of the debate 
will intentionally be left to the experts. This section will take a quick look at the rise 
of the Eastern economies at the dawn of the 21st century while analyzing Turkey’s 
position with reference to its trade relations in the last decade.
A Global Axis Shift: The Rise of the East
Global economic relations have considerably changed in favor of the Eastern 
countries or in more general terms the emerging market economies over the last 
couple decades (i.e. the 90s and 2000s). The share of developing countries –or 
emerging market economies- has consistently increased both in terms of finan-
cial-capital inflows as well as trade-commodity flows. A quick look provides the 
necessary insight on the issue as observed in the course of world merchandise 
trade, based on the World Trade Organization (WTO) statistics. As Russia and 
133
MEHMET BABACAN
China, two giants of the world commod-
ity trade, have intensively engaged in the 
WTO meetings in the last decade with 
the latter already being a member since 
2001, they still constitute a major part 
in world’s trade as well as investments. 
The so-called BRIC (Brazil-Russia-India 
and China) countries, the ASEAN+3 countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia plus China, Ja-
pan, and South Korea), and the developing economies within the G-20 group are 
the rising stars of the global economy in the post-2008 financial crisis period and 
of the new global economic system. Despite the comparatively low levels of capital 
and FDI stocks or world trade shares, compared to the EU-27 and North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) economies, the Eastern powers emerged as 
the representatives of a multi-polar global economy.10 To provide an understand-
ing of the great potential born by the recent giants of the world economy, China’s 
non-financial FDI outflows –not inflows- reached 48 billion US Dollars in 2009 
alone, according to the UN’s 2010 World Investment Report. China’s total out-
bound FDI stock is expected to hit some 500 billion US Dollars as of 2013, accord-
ing to Chinese authorities.11
For a meaningful comparison in the case of Turkey (i.e. the axis shift debate), 
the above and below figures (Figure 2 and Figure 3) provide a depiction of the 
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‘The rise of the East’ is 
gradually becoming a factual 
rather than a perceptional 
phenomenon where Turkey is 
re-positioning itself accordingly
Figure 2. World Merchandise Trade Shares (Exports), 2002-2008
Source: World Trade Organization, 2009
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evolving shares of the EU-27 countries (including intra-EU trade) and the Asian 
economies, including Middle Eastern countries. Accordingly, the total share of 
the EU-27 block in world merchandise trade is steadily declining over the period 
of 2002-2008, from 41 percent down to 37 percent in exports and from 40 percent 
down to 38 percent in imports. Meanwhile, the share of Asian exports witnessed 
an increase from 10 percent up to 12 percent while imports were up from 8 per-
cent to 10 percent.12 Therefore, if the term is applicable, it is quite evident that a 
slow but gradual ‘axis shift’ towards the East is in place on a global scale.
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Source: World Trade Organization, 2009
It should be no surprise to see the declining trend continue in the total trade 
share of the EU countries coupled with the rising share of Asian economies as 
of today, particularly given the financial crisis of 2008. Capital flows to the US 
and the EU markets have significantly slowed down while the inter-trade volume 
among the developed nations (i.e. the G-7 members) was hit considerably over 
the last couple years. In addition, global FDI figures imply that the developed 
economies, such as the US and the UK, were severely affected by the crisis as total 
FDIs declined by 68 percent and 85 percent, respectively in 2009. Overall drop in 
the FDI flows to the 20 developed nations reached 54 percent while the 34 emerg-
ing market economies suffered from a 40 percent decline in the FDI flows in 2009, 
due to the crisis. The aforementioned 54 countries account for more than 90 per-
cent of the world’s total FDI flows –which witnessed some 49 percent decrease in 
2009.13 Recent data that provides a projection for the mid-term also suggests that 
China is expected to surpass all G-7 members, except the US as of 2015, in terms 
Figure 3. World Merchandise Trade Shares (Imports), 2002-2008
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of its economic size.14 The IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) 2010 report 
also suggests that the Emerging and Developing Economies’ stake in world trade 
has increased from a total volume of 3.2 trillion US Dollars (approx.) up to around 
11.8 trillion US Dollars in 2010. During the same period, however, IMF data sug-
gests that the total trade volume of advanced economies witnessed an increase 
from 9.5 trillion US Dollars in 2002 up to 18.2 trillion US Dollars in 2010.15
All in all, ‘the rise of the East’ is gradually becoming a factual rather than a 
perceptional phenomenon where Turkey is re-positioning itself accordingly. The 
emerging and developing economies mostly located in the East are also increas-
ingly the financers of world economic growth. The IMF data projects the total 
debt stock in the US to attain 110.7 percent of the total GDP while it is expected 
to be 89.3 percent for the Euro zone in 2015. The same data indicates expected 
current account deficits of advanced economies to reach around 274.4 billion US 
Dollars in 2015 while emerging and developing economies are expected to run a 
surplus of 763.8 billion US Dollars in 2015.16
Other indicators such as savings and investment numbers are also providing 
a strong indication of emerging economies’ increasing role in the global econo-
my. Net FDI and portfolio investment flows are also suggestive of the developing 
economies’ robust performance regarding their attractiveness for global capital 
movements. According to the most recent estimates, savings rate (as portion of 
the total GDP) for the emerging economies will be reach 33.8 percent, during the 
period of 2012-2015, while the investment ratio will hit 32 percent in the same 
period. Meantime the savings and investment ratios will stand at 19.7 percent and 
20.1 percent, respectively.17
 Turkey’s Eastward Shifting Axis: Integration or Penetration?
For more than half a century, Turkey’s traditional trading markets include the 
EU, Russia, the US, and parts of the Middle East. The EU has the highest share 
due to its market size in terms of geography, population (i.e. demand) as well as 
its GDP. Increased involvement in bilateral trade with the European Union (EU) 
economies implies that Turkey’s export sector needs to maintain its competitive-
ness while being regionally oriented westward. Trade between Europe and Turkey 
has blossomed, especially after Turkey’s accession to the EU Customs Union at the 
end of 1995. Total trade volume hit 81 billion Euros (104 billion US Dollars) in 
2009. However, the Customs Union agreement was signed without concluding a 
free trade agreement. Therefore, Turkey still suffers certain losses due to the lack 
of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) or because it is not a full member of the EU.
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This has led Turks to increasingly 
question the current status of EU-Turkey 
trade, despite the free trade of certain 
goods and preferential access to the EU 
markets, since “this relationship remains 
overly complex and discriminatory to-
ward Turkey in two respects. First, as 
a precondition of joining the customs 
union (CU), Turkey was required to 
adopt the EU’s existing FTAs with part-
ner countries, including the European Free Trade Area. However, arrangements 
between the EU and third countries since 1995 automatically extend to Turkey, 
even though Ankara is excluded from the decision-making process. Second, Turk-
ish markets are automatically opened to these third countries under the customs 
union agreement, but Turkey is not automatically granted reciprocity by the third 
country. Reciprocity depends on Brussels’ goodwill and willingness to include a 
‘Turkish clause’ in their final agreement. This arrangement is unsatisfactory. Turk-
ish commercial policy has essentially been seconded to Brussels without any gain 
in voting rights. Trading away its sovereignty might be a price worth paying if 
EU membership was assured, but membership is not assured. Therefore, the EU 
should adopt a full and comprehensive FTA with Turkey to replace the customs 
union agreement.” 18
A new wave of free trade agreements with neighboring countries is expected to 
take place, as stated in the EU’s 2007 Market Access Strategy. Under such terms, 
Turkey expects to be included in an expanded FTA scheme, such as the Euro-
Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA), as a current member of the Union for 
the Mediterranean. Sectors previously excluded from the EU–Turkish Customs 
Union, including agriculture should therefore be included under such an FTA. 
Although the US is relatively a staunch supporter of Turkey’s EU bid to become 
a full member, the US still gains from Turkey’s advanced ties with the EU as a 
recent analysis puts it: “A bold and comprehensive FTA with Turkey could set 
a precedent for achieving greater volumes of trade than the EU Customs Union 
and would create an enduring basis for EU–Turkish integration separate from the 
highly politicized question of EU membership. Establishing an FTA with Turkey 
in place of the customs union should not remove the prospect of EU membership 
for Turkey. Nor should the EU withdraw its financial aid to Turkey as designated 
under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance. However, if Turkey is ulti-
mately denied EU membership, Ankara will still be in a position to benefit from 
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The share of EU markets in 
terms of Turkish exports 
declined significantly from 
56 percent in 2002, down to 
46 percent in 2009 while Asia’s 
share increased from 14 percent 
up to 25 percent during that 
period
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an enduring trading relationship with the EU and its Mediterranean partners. If 
Turkey’s accession to the EU remains as unlikely as it appears today, Europe needs 
a fallback position to ensure that Turkey still has a reason to maintain good rela-
tions.”19
138
Figure 4. Turkey’s Trading Partners (Export Shares), 2002-2009
Source: TurkStat, 2009
Turkey’s trade with the EU-27 block has been consistently subject to limited 
declines over the period of 2002-2009 in terms of its share in total, as observed in 
the figures above and below. This phenomenon is partly due to the above-men-
tioned problems over the customs union agreement and Turkey’s prolonged quest 
for joining the ‘club’ as a full-member while the EU’s most weighty members, like 
Germany and France, are still resistant to Turkey’s inclusion. It is crystal clear 
that the customs union in practice for instance has not yielded a long-run ‘trade 
creation’ in terms of percentage change but rather a ‘trade diversion’ on behalf of 
Turkey.20 The recent comparative shift in Turkey’s trade with its neighboring coun-
tries and ‘clubs’ has also to do with the globally rising performance of the East, as 
stated in the previous sub-section. In addition, “the share of the EU-27 group in 
the Turkish exports declined from 48 percent down to 46 percent between 2008 
and 2009, which is considered as a setback in Turkey’s traditional trade markets 
and an indicator of both a shift of axis in the EU markets and Turkish exports, by 
some circles. Accordingly, a recent global shift away from the EU-27 block to the 
rest of the world is taking place in terms of multi-national firm operations, invest-
ments and capital and commodity flows during the crisis period of 2008-2009.”21 
Turkey however missed the opportunity of both increasing its exports to the EU 
Whither an Axis Shift: A Perspective from Turkey’s Foreign Trade
members in a period of declining intra-EU trade figures while taking advantage of 
outbound capital and commodity flows as it attracted significant amounts of FDIs 
and boosted its trade volume over the last decade.
According to the relevant figures above and below (Figure 4 and Figure 5), 
Turkey’s trade with the Asian economies, including the Mideast countries, is con-
stantly rising while there is a gradual decline observed in the trade with EU-27 
during the period of 2002-2009, despite the slight correction for the imports from 
the EU in 2009. The share of EU markets in terms of Turkish exports declined sig-
nificantly from 56 percent in 2002, down to 46 percent in 2009 while Asia’s share 
increased from 14 percent up to 25 percent during that period. For the imports, 
EU’s share declined from roughly 50 percent down to 40 percent over the period 
of 2002-2009 while the share of Asian countries surged from around 19 percent in 
2002 up to 27 percent in 2009.
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Source: TurkStat, 2009
Figure 5. Turkey’s Trading Partners (Import Shares), 2002-2009
Another significant development in Turkish trade is observed in the relative 
changes in the shares of Turkey’s domestic regions in the context of its total trade 
volume. Turkey’s South-Eastern Anatolian and Mediterranean regions as well 
as the Eastern Anatolian region gained comparative advantages in the period of 
2002-2009 where a significant overall increase was witnessed (see Table 7). Cross-
border trade also made a substantial contribution to the recent increase in trade 
activities in the Southeastern provinces, thanks to the visa-free travel regimes and 
reduced bureaucracy since 2002. Turkey’s recently improving ties with Middle 
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Eastern and North African countries as well as Russia and other Eastern econo-
mies are in part due to the overall development in the Turkish trade sector’s per-
formance and also in part due to the EU-Turkey political issues (including the 
visa disputes). Therefore, it is still too early to speak about an axis shift, as the 
EU-27 block will remain the main trading partner for Turkey for the foreseeable 
future, even if its full-membership bid fails to produce the successful outcome 
Turkey has been working towards achieving in the next decade.
Turkey has successfully managed to increase its total trade volume as well as 
the diversity of its destinations in the period of 2002-2009 while the main axis of 
its foreign trade partners remained unchanged. The figures from OECD –pro-
vided in the Table 1 below- imply that Turkish trade has witnessed a significant 
decline almost in all fronts, except the group of African countries, during the re-
cent global financial downturn. However, during the whole period of 2002-2009, 
the weight of the EU-27 countries has seen a relative decline while the rest of the 
world accounts for an increasing share of Turkey’s total trade in terms of percent-
ages. That alone does not indicate a shift of axis but rather the effective utilization 
of potential markets, i.e. in Africa.
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Source: OECD Statistical Database, 2010
The above table provides insight on Turkey’s commodity trade, which clearly 
indicates a decline both in Middle Eastern and European trade volumes dur-
ing the recent crisis period (2008-2009) while during times of the world trade 
Table 1. Turkey’s Trade by OECD Country Group Classification, 2002-2009
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booms (2002-2007) there was an increase. Significant determinants of an ‘axis 
shift’ should have also revealed themselves in terms of services and labor flows. 
Although the latter is still far from being accomplished in today’s world, the first 
is increasingly developing, particularly with the EU. As underlined in the previous 
sections, Turkey’s service industry has strong ties with its European counterparts, 
in telecommunications, tourism, and finance. Therefore, bilateral trade in services 
which reached 46.5 billion US Dollars in 2008, mostly with the EU members is yet 
another indicator of a broadening axis, rather than an ‘axis shift.’22
Trade Booms and Busts: Signs of an ‘Axis Shift’?
Turkey has witnessed periods of trade booms and busts for decades. However, 
all are associated with periods of political stability or instability which had their 
corollary economic repercussions. In this section, the theoretical foundation of 
Turkey’s so-called axis shift from a trade perspective is questioned. Empirical evi-
dence and recent data are employed in the analysis when necessary. Relevant links 
between the recent political orientation and its economic consequences will also 
be reflected under the following sub-sections. The increasing influence of Turkey’s 
new diplomatic assertion in its region is argued to be coupled with deepening 
economic ties manifesting itself in the number of free trade agreements, visa-free 
travel agreements, and even in new flight routes between Turkey and its partners. 
Turkey’s increasing relations with its neighbors will be analyzed first through the 
‘gravity equation’ tool in the new trade theory which focuses on the geographic 
as well as cultural proximity of countries engaging in bilateral trade. The second 
sub-section will underline the important transition of the political and diplomatic 
dimensions into the economic dimension. Finally, last sub-section will discuss the 
lack of a long-term economic strategy to maximize Turkey’s foreign trade poten-
tial with its neighbors as well as its other trading partners.
 Turkey’s FTAs and the New Gravity Equation
Gravity (equation) models are considerably new to the theory of international 
trade though they have been in use for more than a decade now. In general, new 
trade theory takes economic size, geography or rather proximity, culture, com-
mon language or borders and other such issues into account in order to estimate 
the role of trade in cross-country growth forecasts. In the case of Turkey, the FTAs 
created more than the customs union with the EU, as they are increasingly effec-
tive in diversifying and magnifying Turkish exports. The table below and the map 
provide an insight into Turkey’s new trade dimensions, taking the common ele-
ments in bilateral relations into account.
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Turkey’s new trading partners are not only in the Greater Middle East but also 
in Latin America, Asia and North America as well as Africa as shown in the above 
Map 1. It depicts the countries that Turkey has engaged with in terms of FTAs. 
Although common language (as seen in bilateral relations with Central Asian 
and Caucasian countries), cultural heritage and ties (observed in Middle Eastern, 
Caucasian, and Balkan regions), and shared borders (in all cases) are important 
elements of the rapprochement to the aforementioned regions, Turkey has man-
aged to establish a widespread network of bilateral trade relations even with very 
distant (both geographically and culturally) countries via governmental and pri-
vate initiatives since 2002. The history of the preferential trade agreements signed 
by Turkey, however, dates back to before the first FTA was established with the Eu-
ropean Free Trade Association (EFTA) –represented by Austria, Finland, Switzer-
land, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Sweden in 1992. Since then, Turkey has 
realized more than a dozen of FTAs (excluding the customs union agreements) 
with varying countries as indicated in Table 2 below.
While establishing FTAs and RTAs throughout different regions in the world, 
Turkey has managed to establish visa-free travel regimes at all levels with more 
than a dozen countries within the last decade. Countries that Turkey signed 
mutual visa-free travel agreements on different levels or visa holder-status in-
clude: Tajikistan (2003 and 2009); Uzbekistan (2003); Romania (2004); Guate-
mala (2004); Venezuela (2005); Paraguay (2006); Colombia (2006); Latvia (2006); 
Vietnam (2007); Kuwait (2007); Afghanistan (2007); Montenegro (2008); In-
dia (2008); UAE (2008); Kosovo (2009); Djibouti (2009); Syria (2009); Pakistan 
(2009); Albania (2009); Kenya (2009); Qatar (2009); Libya (2009); Jordan (2009); 
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Map 1. Turkey’s Free Trade Agreements (FTAs; based on WTO Data)
Source: Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade, March 2009
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Azerbaijan (2009); Lebanon (2010); Tanzania (2010); Cameroon (2010); Russia 
(2010); Serbia (2010); Portugal (2010); and Greece (2010).23 One could assess the 
reach and diversity of Turkey’s new foreign policy and thus trade relations via 
established free trade agreements, new flight routes, and visa agreements which 
indicate a multi-polar geographic orientation rather than a clear-cut axis shift. In 
addition, the Turkish Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade documents reveal that 
the government is in negotiations to finalize the establishment of FTAs with Leba-
non, the GCC countries, Ukraine, MERCOSUR countries, Libya, Mauritius, Sey-
chelles, and Faroe Islands while initiating talks with Mexico, Algeria, South Af-
rican Customs Union, ASEAN, South Africa, ANDEAN, India and 36 countries 
under Africa Caribbean Pacific Group of States (ACP).24 Therefore, the relatively 
unexploited nature of Turkey’s bilateral trade with the aforementioned countries 
or groups offers a unique opportunity to rapidly develop further economic and 
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Table 2. Turkey’s Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)
Source: World Trade Organization (WTO) and Turkish Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade, 2009
MEHMET BABACAN
commercial ties. This list of countries, on its own, is irrefutable evidence that the 
argument for an axis shift is weak and it has much more to do with providing 
some insight into Turkey’s future vision of diversifying its trade destinations. 
The role of ‘gravity equation’ becomes crucial when the location, size, and di-
versity of the newly established FTAs or other forms of bilateral trade relations 
are taken into account. Recent studies on the impact of trade on cross-country in-
come growth rates have been investigating alternative instruments for trade. For 
instance, a pioneering work in the trade-growth literature provides geographical 
instruments for countries’ overall trade based on the standard gravity equation.25 
The distance between countries that have bilateral trade and the country sizes are 
used as instruments which are seemingly unrelated to any other factor affecting 
their income levels, respectively. While using one of the instruments, however, 
one should control the other since they are negatively correlated. Constructing an 
instrumental variable for trade and estimating the effects on income suggest that 
the trade share may not have a positive significant effect on income growth while 
in some cases trade variables have insignificant positive or again insignificant neg-
ative coefficients. In general, however, using geographical variables as instruments 
for both bilateral and international trade alone could be said to eliminate statisti-
cally relevant problems issues but it does not always provide satisfactory results in 
explaining the effects of trade on income.
 The Role of Politics on Turkey’s Trade Policy
At the dawn of 21st century, Turkey has become increasingly a global actor 
while still revealing that its capacities are mostly regional and it possesses internal 
weaknesses. Nevertheless, many argue, more powerful than a decade ago, Turkey 
has emerged as a key member in international organizations, including the Unit-
ed Nations Security Council, Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the 
OECD, even in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. The 
latter two, however, should be read under the context of the increasing influence 
of emerging market economies altogether. Along with the increasing weight in the 
IMF and the World Bank Group, Turkey’s G-20 membership (1999) also becomes 
more critical and operational nowadays, thanks to the gradually evolving nature 
of the global economy and governance since 2008.26
Regarding Turkey’s relations with and its position in the Middle East particu-
larly, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu underlined the importance of paying at-
tention to the region at least in terms of its potential strategic assets while showing 
efforts to put the pieces together in the ‘geo-economically torn apart’ Mid-eastern 
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countries.27 On economic ties with the European Union (EU), Turkey’s foreign 
policy chief stresses that due to the uncertainties regarding the future track of Tur-
key’s EU membership processes, the country should formulate a new development 
strategy based not only on its domestic potential but also to support the potential 
opportunities originating from its geographic location.28 In an assessment of the 
foreign policy developments of 2007, Davutoglu asserted that Turkey’s diverse re-
gional composition or unique central position gives her a capacity to maneuver 
in several regions simultaneously, which in turn creates an area of influence in its 
immediate environs.29 The five pillars of Turkey’s new foreign policy vision have 
been delineated as follows: i) balance between security and democracy; ii) ‘zero 
problem policy toward Turkey’s neighbors’; iii) development of relations with 
neighboring and distant regions; iv) adherence to a multi-dimensional foreign 
policy; and v) rhythmic diplomacy. Within the framework of these five pillars, 
Davutoglu refers to the role of individuals, corporations, and civil organizations 
as complementary in the pursuit of Turkey’s foreign policy.30 Diplomatic efforts 
for increasing regional political and economic stability included mediation in the 
indirect peace talks between Israel and Syria, diplomatic engagement in Iraqi pol-
itics, and the mediation of nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 countries (five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council, EU and Germany) together 
with Brazil. Turkey’s pursuit for stability on the domestic, regional, and global 
fronts is accompanied by its increasing economic presence in its own region and 
the world.
Turkey is asserting its new geo-strategic position through a series of policies 
and instruments within the theoretical cadre of strategic engagement accompa-
nied by practical and often tactical moves to enhance regional and bilateral dip-
lomatic and economic relations. An emerging business group, TUSKON, which 
is largely comprised of exporters, has been actively engaged in African and East 
Asian markets while another business group, the Independent Industrialists and 
Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD) is in search for increased cooperation with 
the Gulf countries. In the meantime, Turkey’s oldest business group, the Turk-
ish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD), continues to actively 
lobby for the eventual EU membership of the country. Given such a diversified 
composition of efforts to promote Turkey’s global position, one should also note 
the dramatic rise in the number of direct or indirect flight routes of the national 
flagship carrier, Turkish Airlines (THY), since 2002. Between 2002 and 2010, the 
distribution of the newly opened routes is also informative, as 14 out of the total 
58 new routes are to European cities, while 18 routes are to Asia. THY meantime 
has opened 14 flight routes to the Middle Eastern and North African cities, along 
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with eight new routes in Africa.31 Businessmen are now easily traveling and con-
ducting business with their counterparts via direct flights to the capitals of Africa, 
Asia, and Europe. 
Turkey’s increased economic influence in its region manifested itself in the 
volume of trade with neighboring countries, as observed in Turkish-Iranian bilat-
eral trade figures (up from 1.2 billion US Dollars in 2002 to around 5.4 billion US 
Dollars in 2009); Turkish-Russian bilateral trade figures (up from 5.1 billion US 
Dollars in 2002 to 22.7 billion US Dollars in 2009) and Turkish-Syrian bilateral 
trade figures (up from 773 million US Dollars in 2002 to 1.8 billion US Dollars in 
2009), despite the negative effects of the recent global financial crisis.32 Similarly, 
the total trade volume with the Latin American and Caribbean countries rose 
from 735 million US Dollars in 2002 to more than 4 billion US Dollars as of 2008. 
As the study aimed to demonstrate, all of the figures illustrated are practical indi-
cators reflecting Turkey’s changing foreign policy structure from an international 
trade perspective.
Economists often argue that political outcomes or the type of the state can 
effectively create an ‘efficient’ trade policy scheme. The interplay of economic/
commercial actors in a country or at the global level has a significant result on 
potential trade games and even trade wars.33 The relationship between trade and 
growth and their impact on income distribution within and across countries has 
been intensively discussed in a vast body of literature. The relative changes in the 
income levels among different business groups or industrial segments in Turkey 
also result from the interplay between politics and trade policies.
In shaping a country’s trade policy, the size of its domestic market, the vari-
ety of its products (i.e. amount of capital or intermediate goods), and geographic 
proximity are among several important elements. Trade laws and the efficiency in 
doing business are other components to impede or speed up the country’s trade 
performance. As politics are important in shaping trade policies, the latter is also 
effective on income creation and redistribution mechanisms.34 Trade policies are 
usually correlated with other factors related to income (growth), for instance, the 
adoption of free market trade policies as is the case with Turkey in the 1980s, as 
in other developing countries, brought about subsequent policy measures such as 
financial liberalization. The aim of this paper is, however, to isolate the rest of the 
factors other than trade that would explain Turkey’s current economic policies. 
Therefore, the recent developments on the political scene and its reflections on 
trade policy will be at the focus of this analysis. Since the early ’90s, the emerging 
business groups can be described as the economic face of Turkey’s changing polit-
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ical environment. Despite the continuing role of TUSIAD in the political sphere, 
MUSIAD and export unions such as the Turkish Exporters’ Assembly (TIM) or 
formations like TUSKON in recent years are increasingly effective in shaping the 
country’s trade policies. Traditional conglomerates mostly represented under TU-
SIAD are mostly clustered in automotive, chemicals and metals, construction and 
energy, finance and pharmaceutical industries while relatively smaller size firms 
–mostly represented in MUSIAD- operate in textiles, retail, consumer electronics 
and food sectors. 
Turkey’s emerging trade destinations provide a relative advantage for the 
smaller size entrepreneurs due to their firm size while yielding significant 
amounts of positive externalities for the conglomerates in their increased bilat-
eral economic ties as well. Turkey’s new trade orientation or re-balancing act 
has been, therefore, beneficial to all parties at the domestic level while providing 
cyclical results –beside Africa- at the international level. The latter argument is 
evident in Turkey’s significant losses in European, North American, Asian and 
Middle Eastern –including Gulf countries- bilateral trade volumes (see Table 5 
and Table 6).
Despite the increasing trade volume with its neighbors in recent years, Tur-
key has not adopted a well-structured long-term export strategy though its new 
pro-active foreign policy aims at creating regional economic zones. An ad hoc 
rather than a systematic approach is embraced in trade policy while the role of 
aforementioned business groups earns increasing weight. The inter-governmental 
relations pave the way for exporter to reach new markets while a comprehen-
sive trade strategy is still far from being implemented. Turkish exporters are still 
highly dependent on state policies and the possible agency problems might hinder 
further economic development as bureaucratic and administrative quality are key 
to success in such a framework. Despite the recent rise in Turkey’s trade perfor-
mance, we may conclude, it is too early to suggest an ‘axis shift’ in the modes of 
production and the relative roles of small and middle sized entrepreneurships 
(SMEs) versus conglomerates. TUSIAD in that sense continues to be the leading 
club both in terms of its total trade volume and the value-added.
 Prospects for Turkish Trade in a Changing Global Economy
Due to the structural comparative advantage and the country’s increasing 
competitiveness, Turkey is expected to remain as one of the foremost trading 
partners for the EU countries. It is quite natural for a pivotal state like Turkey 
to develop new ties with the global economies’ rising stars and its neighboring 
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countries due to several reasons: in-
creasing economic power (GDPs etc.), 
dynamic population (driving the de-
mand), and common ties (i.e. geography, 
history, religion and culture). Therefore, 
an axis shift debate becomes obsolete 
when studying the facts and once the 
negative and skeptical perceptions over 
Turkey’s new foreign (trade) policy are removed. Such a debate reveals the rem-
nants of the old compartmentalizing mentality of the Cold War in the minds of 
Turkey’s Western allies.
The traditional Western perception of the ‘East’ once again seems to have 
emerged in the recent ‘axis shift’ debates without any solid basis. In the wake of 
changing global economic setup with the rise of G-20 specifically, it would be 
quite normal to see Turkey becoming a regional player as well as an actor in the 
newly shaping global economic structure. Based on the trend over the last decade, 
we could argue that Turkey continues to promote new development in terms of its 
foreign trade. This trend could continue for the foreseeable future given the politi-
cal stability within the country combined with favorable global economic condi-
tions, particularly for the developing economies. The significant dependence over 
the import of intermediate goods and the lack of a proper R&D strategy, however, 
are among the factors which hinder a more rapid economic growth in the country. 
In the meantime, Turkey needs to develop a long-term trade policy strategy plan 
to address the current weaknesses in its production, marketing, and other seg-
ments of its trade structure.
The differences in the rate of economic growth are often observed to depend 
on the relative sizes of the countries under the endogenous growth models –which 
imply that positive gains or increasing returns of scale are possible provided that 
endogenous factors are driving the rate of growth among countries. Therefore, in-
creasing the size of a country leads to expanding the variety in intermediate goods 
and results in efficiency gains in production of the final goods. This increased 
diversity in exported goods is found to have a positive effect on trade volumes and 
thus growth rates, as shown in numerous empirical works. Another implication is 
the decreasing fixed costs of innovative new intermediate inputs. This is the cause 
of a permanent increase in the output due to a larger country size. Therefore, 
we may conclude that Turkey’s trade with its neighbors and other short-distance 
partners will yield relatively bigger gains for itself. However, it is all directly linked 
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to a comprehensive industrial and commercial policy design, which will provide 
substantial productivity increases in the long-run. The size or scale effect and pro-
ductivity increase would not have the same impact in cases where policies do not 
matter. It is, however, crucial for Turkey to maintain a robust and continuous 
productivity increase that would guarantee competitiveness.
The endogenous growth models referred above also imply that with knowl-
edge spillovers, trade increases the growth rates. In that sense, Turkey’s trade with 
a wider set of countries will benefit all parties in many aspects. Table 3 and Table 4 
provide a clear understanding of the lack of a sustainable export-oriented growth 
strategy as the export and import shares of intermediate goods –which are crucial 
for final production-, are hardly correlated. In 2009 only, the amount of interme-
diate goods imported (99.5 billion US Dollars) is almost as much as Turkey’s total 
Table 3. Turkey’s Export Structure, 2000-2009 (in terms of BEC)
Source: TurkStat, 2009
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exports (102.1 billion US Dollars). Another way to look at Turkey’s performance 
in terms of a structural breakthrough is to assess the technology component or 
share in export goods. In both terms, Turkey is far from producing value-added 
items that would increase efficiency as well as overall economic infrastructure.
Turkey’s recent rise, based on its rapid economic growth, is reinforced by its 
strong ties to the EU, as it obligates Turkish exporters to function with a high level 
of standards. Positioned at the top of the quality ladder, the EU markets drive the 
export sector to become more competitive by increasing the quality of commodi-
ties and services while maintaining competitive price levels. With its unique geo-
graphic advantage, supported by a dynamic population and a significantly large 
market size as well as improving human and physical capital stock, Turkey is also 
becoming an indispensable partner of European trade. As depicted in Table 5, 
Table 4. Turkey’s Import Structure, 2000-2009 (in terms of BEC)
Source: TurkStat, 2009
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Table 5. Major Trade Partners of the EU-27
Source: European Commission (EC), 2010
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Source: Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade, 2009
Table 6. Turkey’s Trade with Selected Countries, 2008-2009
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Turkey’s position among EU-27’s trade 
partners is almost unchanged over the 
period of 2005-2009, as it ranks 7th in the 
whole five-year period, which could be 
read as another rejection of the axis shift 
arguments.
Turkey’s trade is dominated by the 
traditionally advantageous export in-
dustries, such as textiles, machinery, 
chemicals, plastics, metals and automo-
tive subsidiaries. This is true not only for trade with the EU-member countries 
but also the newly engaged markets. However, for Turkey to ensure a sustainable 
future for its exports - it is crucial that it make a significant shift towards high-
technology intensive products. As observed in Table 3, 4 and 5, the structural 
breakthrough for the export sector is vital for a sustainable path to maintain 
long-run growth. The export sector should strive to reach a significant level of 
quality and creativity in terms of marketing power as well as productive and in-
novative capabilities in order to meet its full potential. The recent global financial 
turmoil can be used as an experimental case for our study since it revealed the 
structural weaknesses of Turkey’s export sector and its high level of dependency 
to imported goods. During the period of 2008-2009, Turkey’s trade with its tra-
ditional partners such as EU-27, North America, Russia, China, and the Middle 
East as well as many other markets shrank dramatically, as observed in Table 6. 
The only exception to this general rule came from certain North African and 
Central Asian markets.
Turkey’s export sector should, therefore, learn how to advance in terms of 
technological capacities as well as marketing power. Turkey is not the dominant 
power or the leader as an exporter in the new markets it has extended its arms 
across the globe. Therefore, Turkey needs a comprehensive strategy that takes 
geographical, cultural and social as well as technological and economic (i.e. ef-
ficiency) aspects into account, which will pave the way to succeed in the long-
term. Turkey’s recent foreign policy orientation towards its region and the world 
could facilitate the creation of positive externalities. However, Turkey’s failure 
to design a profound economic strategy might lead to an alignment of interests 
of the policy-makers and the business circles in the short-run. The rent-seeking 
business groups that aim to maximize profits and the current export-oriented 
regime fostered by the government will run counter to the need for generating 
Turkey’s recent initiatives and 
relative orientation towards 
the East does not only stem 
from its own policy choices but 
also reflects an indispensible 
necessity due to the evolving 
nature of the world political 
and economic makeup
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the necessary technological and innova-
tive infrastructure the Turkish economy 
requires to position itself on the world 
trade stage as a permanent and power-
ful actor. Unfortunately, this has already 
manifested itself by Turkey’s low level of 
investment in technology and registered 
patents. The lack of value-added in most of the sectors also leads to a higher cur-
rent account deficit, which is an additional constraint to Turkey’s path towards 
long-term sustainable growth.
Conclusion
Turkey is emerging as a pivotal state with its vibrant economy and increasingly 
stable domestic political scene in the first decade of the 21st century. The present 
paper provides an insightful while critical understanding of the evolving nature of 
the debates hovering over Turkey’s new foreign policy structure through Turkey’s 
perspective of foreign trade from 2002 to 2010. A detailed and careful analysis re-
veals that the so-called ‘axis shift’ debate becomes obsolete once factual economic 
indicators are demonstrated and analyzed. From the number of flights overseas 
to the mutual visa-exemption agreements, and the establishment of cross-border 
commercial ties; all are indicators of Turkey’s changing trade environment. 
Turkey’s recent initiatives and relative orientation towards the East does not 
only stem from its own policy choices but also reflects an indispensible necessity 
due to the evolving nature of the world political and economic makeup. There-
fore, this analysis puts forward the argument that Turkey does not fit into an ‘axis 
shift’ debate. The term that would best coin the recent developments might be an 
‘expansionary axis’ or a new ‘creative axis’. The ongoing trend in Turkey’s recent 
foreign policy and, therefore, foreign trade rapprochement with the East in broad 
terms, seems to have entered into a new phase that could be irreversible. However, 
the current global trends would need to prevail in the medium and long-term.
Nonetheless, Turkey’s new trade destinations and relations have helped to al-
leviate the negative impact of the global financial crisis of 2008. Although Turkey’s 
GDP shrank by 4.7 percent and its total trade volume significantly dropped by 
around 27 percent on annual basis,35 Turkey has managed to avoid a long-term 
recession as its economy is expected to grow at a rate of above 7 percent in 201036 
and the total trade volume is estimated to dramatically recover. However, the neg-
ative counterpart is Turkey’s widening current account deficit, of which its trade 
Turkey’s new trade destinations 
and relations have helped to 
alleviate the negative impact of 
the global financial crisis 
of 2008
154
Whither an Axis Shift: A Perspective from Turkey’s Foreign Trade
deficit is a major factor. As Turkey’s trade volume increases, so does its deficit, 
due to structural issues as stated in the previous sections. Therefore, a sustainable 
trade scheme should incorporate a solution to remedy the structural deficit prob-
lem, which stems from the mode of production and low levels of technology, thus 
Turkey produces products with a weak value-added.
Since the current trade deficit is unsustainable in the long-run, Turkey’s re-
cently discovered trade relations, which usually yield trade surpluses are of crucial 
importance to achieve a balanced path to foreign trade. Such a structural break 
would only have long-term positive contribution to the aggregate economy. As 
long as Turkey’s engagement with the European markets on economic grounds 
and the EU on the political continues, the current level of bilateral trade with the 
EU-27 club will get closer to reaching its full potential, as it contributes greatly to 
Turkey’s economic growth. The relatively less-utilized markets, however, provide 
a broad set of opportunities in terms of its ‘value-added’ in foreign trade. Given 
the lack of a proper structure for its trade with the EU and the current imbalances 
in bilateral trade with countries such as China, Turkey’s elusive quest for new 
trade partners and regions is indispensable.
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